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The Illness of Narrative: Reframing the Question of 
Limits 
_Abstract 
This paper uses Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground as the starting point for a 
critique of the assumption that engaging with narratives enhances well-being. While 
the ‘limits of narrative’ have long been an object of critique by scholars in the medical 
humanities, the question of limits has been posed primarily in terms of whether nar-
rativity can be considered an anthropological universal, and in terms of what (or 
whom) a privileging of narrativity might exclude. Through Dostoevsky, we reframe 
this problem by asking whether the construction of selves through narrative can 
and should be regarded as a ‘healthy’ norm, even for those in whom this activity ap-
pears to come naturally. Dostoevsky identified a dark side to the ‘heightened con-
sciousness’ associated with supposedly enlightened modern individuals. He critiques 
a tendency towards ever increasing abstraction from concrete existence and embodies 
this critique in the character of the “underground man,” a man plagued by sickness 
and distress, partly because he can only conduct his life on the basis of what he has 
read. The paper urges those working in the medical humanities today to formulate an 
adequate response to the paradoxes exhibited in Dostoevsky’s great novel. 
 
1_Prologue 
You see, we have reached the point where we 
look upon real ‘living life’ almost as a burden, al-
most as servitude, and we are all agreed amongst 
ourselves that it is much better to live life accord-
ing to books. […] Yes indeed! Look more care-
fully! […] Leave us alone, without books, and 
we’d instantly trip up, get lost — we don’t know 
where to place our allegiance, what to hang on to; 
what to love and what to hate, what to respect and 
what to despise. We even find it difficult to be hu-
man beings — human beings with our own flesh 
and blood; we’re ashamed of it, we consider it a 
disgrace and strive to be some kind of imaginary 
general type. We are stillborn, and for a long time 
we have not been begotten of living fathers and 
this pleases us more and more. We are acquiring 
the taste. Before long we’ll think up a way of be-
ing somehow begotten by an idea. But enough; I 
don’t want to write any more ‘from the under-
ground.’1 
The primary medium within which identities are 
created and have their currency is not just linguis-
tic, but textual: persons are largely ascribed iden-
tities according to the manner of their embedding 
within a discourse — in their own or in the dis-
course of others.2 
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In the first of our opening quotations, a great 19th-century novelist points to the role of 
books in supplying ‘texts of identity’ and to the “negative relationship to human em-
bodiment that is engendered by this process of textualisation.” For Dostoevsky, our 
reliance on “books” is symptomatic of the illness he ascribes to the moderns, a condi-
tion that stems from a superabundance of (self-)consciousness. Being “too conscious” 
is a “genuine full-blown illness” not only because it paralyses any capacity to act — by 
trapping man in an infinitely regressive process of interrogating motives, causes, justi-
fications — but also, ultimately, in that it confounds the very categories of pride and 
shame, pleasure and pain, illness and health: 
‘Ha, ha, ha! Next you’ll be trying to find pleasure in toothache,’ you’ll shout with 
a laugh. ‘And what if I do? There is pleasure in toothache,’ I’ll reply.3 
It is this profound and dangerous lack of orientation, this having lost touch with the 
spontaneous values of nature and truth, that calls for “books” in Notes from the Under-
ground — narratives on which to model allegiances, affects, preferences, indeed iden-
tity.4 The narrator would rather be an insect, he assures us, than bear the burden of the 
detached, vacillating half-existence to which his heightened consciousness condemns 
him. At the same time, his predicament, and that of his generation, is to have acquired 
a taste for this perverse form of existence: soon, he ventures, we will figure out how to 
do away with flesh and blood altogether, how to be “begotten by an idea,” in complete 
abstraction from “real ‘living life.’” 
A century and a quarter after the publication of Notes from the Underground, this 
“prophecy of de-realisation” appears to have come true in the second quotation, by 
Shotter and Gergen.5 In one of the founding statements of the narrative turn in psychol-
ogy, what for Dostoevsky had been the symptom of a modern illness becomes a full-
blown cure. From at least the late 1980s, textuality and narrativity have been associated 
with a ‘postmodern’ promise of emancipation, not from the shackles of the body as 
such, as flesh and blood, but from the shackles of normative forms of identity (sexual, 
gendered, racial, and so on) until then presumed to inhere in the body — in ‘nature’ 
and ‘truth’ as discursively defined from without, by the powers that be. Inspired by a 
heady mix of speech-act philosophy, hermeneutics, ethnomethodology, structural lin-
guistics, pragmatics, semiotics, post-structuralism, and literary theory, many social sci-
entists and critical psychologists deployed the notion of discourse and its variants (nar-
rative, text, story) to launch challenges to the positivistic mainstream. This mainstream 
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was perceived to be unquestioningly oriented toward natural scientific modes of prac-
tice accused of ignoring the historical and cultural constitution of human subjectivity 
and sociality. Davies and Harré, for example, developed the post-structuralist concept 
of “subject positioning” to theorize “the constitutive force of […] discursive practice,” 
announcing no less than that “among the products of discursive practices are the very 
persons who engage in them.”6 
In the fields of medicine and health, the emancipatory promise of this textual turn 
was, for obvious reasons, quickly confronted with the limits of the body. The event of 
sickness — the irruption of flesh and blood as agents of narrative devastation — fore-
grounded embodiment as a constraining factor on what stories could be told. In the 
field-defining work of Arthur Frank, both selves and narratives are embodied, and his 
approach posits a “complex mutual relation between the body and culture.” The typol-
ogy of body-selves he develops in The Wounded Storyteller, based on how each type 
addresses everyday “problems” that arise by the simple fact of being/having a body, 
implies that our experience of embodiment is always already structured by culturally 
available discursive models, even if these remain typically implicit until disrupted by 
an event of illness. Illness, as Frank well puts it, “requires new and more self-conscious 
solutions,” and thereby offers the opportunity not only to become aware of previously 
implicit narratives, but also to narratively reconstruct oneself in new ways.7 Thus, de-
spite the encounter with embodiment that illness makes inevitable, Frank’s position 
retains the distinctive welcoming orientation to the notion — so disturbing to Dostoev-
sky — that human beings are “begotten by an idea” or, more specifically, that we are 
begotten by stories: “[S]tories conduct people as a conductor conducts an orchestra.”8 
What is more, the idea that alarmed Dostoevsky is given a boost by the explicit sug-
gestion that the stories we live by constitute us as ethical (or unethical) beings, and that 
this quality in turn is intimately related to the potential that stories hold for being agents 
of therapeutic change. Since “selves act in ways that choose their bodies,” the key to 
the healing properties of narrative lies in a moral imperative to engage in a “perpetual 
self-reflection on the kind of person that one’s story is shaping one into, entailing the 
requirement to change that self-story if the wrong self is being shaped.”9 What is this, 
if not a prescription for superabundant self-consciousness? What Dostoevsky had de-
scribed as the illness afflicting “underground man” has come full circle, as in Shotter 
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and Gergen, to being described as a route to emancipation, an ethical norm, and a norm 
of health. 
Where Dostoevsky wanted to contrast the one who truly lives with the one who lives 
only through stories, Frank seems to want us to acknowledge that, actually, it is only 
stories that really live. When he insists that we human beings merely “hitch a ride” on 
stories he is teasingly aware that those unfamiliar with the death-of-the-author trope 
will be disturbed by this “de-stabilizing of the sovereignty of consciousness.”10 Only 
the un-reconstructed can retain the illusion that it is they who tell stories based on their 
experience. In fact, it is stories that are the real living, breathing things: it is they that 
animate us. What the unreconstructed amongst us glibly think of as our experience is 
in fact nothing but the pale imitation of what is given by a story. According to Frank, 
the great writers like Tolstoy tell us this truth better than anyone. But Frank’s appeal, 
he assures us, is not merely to the greats: 
I do not believe that stories breathe because Tolstoy so clearly depicts it in his 
story of Mademoiselle Bourienne. Instead, I believe Tolstoy’s story because it ex-
presses what is already my own lived experience, and at the beginning of that 
experience as I can know it are stories.11 
This is a remarkable theoretical move on Frank’s part. His reason for believing that 
experience is constructed by and for stories is that he has experienced this directly him-
self: he has experienced the fact that his experience is constructed by stories. This is an 
appeal to lived experience that essentially disqualifies lived experience because lived 
experience can only be storied-into-being. Dostoevsky’s angst has long been forgotten: 
Frank, like many who are enthusiastic about the healing powers of narrative, has ac-
quired the taste for being begotten by a story. Furthermore, one wonders — given this 
premise that experience is conducted by stories — on what basis Frank’s perpetually 
self-reflecting story-shifter comes to the conclusion that they have been using the 
wrong story to shape the wrong self. Why tell the story that one has been telling the 
wrong story? 
2_What is the Problem with Narrativity? A Contemporary View 
This is not the place to revisit the story of how and why ‘illness narratives’ have come 
to matter in medical education and clinical practice, after emerging and evolving as a 
distinctive literary genre in the second half of the 20th century.12 The literature on the 
topic is so vast that, by now, it is not unusual for new contributions to be prefaced by 
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disclaimers as to any comprehensiveness of scope or intention. Much of this literature 
has addressed the nature of the relationship between narrative and experience, or what 
anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly, in a text that still usefully synthesizes the key issues, 
has described as the “mimetic question.” By “mimetic” Mattingly means any theoreti-
cal stance that puts experience prior to narrative by assuming that narrative represents 
or even ‘imitates’ experience. Mattingly discusses a range of anti-mimetic positions, 
the most extreme one of which is that experience itself should be regarded as a phe-
nomenological “illusion” created by narrative: “There is no reality without narrative. 
[…] Because we have stories, we believe we are having experiences. Experience is, at 
best […] an enactment of pre-given stories.”13 This position treats stories as if they 
were ‘platonic forms’ and experiences, by contrast, as the somewhat incidental and 
accidental manifestations that these stories take when they happen to be ‘earthed’ by a 
passing individual. This, as we have seen, is the position endorsed by Arthur Frank. 
This now classic version of narratology has been subject to substantial criticism in 
medical humanities over the past decade or so. Of particular concern are the normative 
assumptions at play in endorsing narrativity as a universal, a-historical, and health-
preserving feature of human experience. These are what Angela Woods, following Ga-
len Strawson, describes as the psychological narrativity thesis, or the notion that “hu-
man beings typically experience their life as a narrative or story of some sort” and the 
ethical narrativity thesis, or the notion that “a richly narrative outlook is essential to a 
well lived life, to true or full personhood.”14 Woods does not dispute the quality of the 
intentions of those who advocate the use of narrative specifically in relation to illness 
and to medical contexts. They, she writes, share “a commitment to understanding the 
centrality of the illness experience to the medical treatment of disease, taking seriously 
stories of illness, and valuing the individual as the empowered author-narrator of her 
own story,” all of which are commendable goals.15 Neither does she propose that we 
should aim to “do without” narrative or discourage doctors and patients from telling 
stories. Nevertheless, synthesizing a range of previous critiques, Woods articulates an 
urgent need for reflexivity, stressing the importance of querying how specific and dom-
inant kinds of narrative may function to “produce Western middle-class, liberal and 
neo-liberal modes of being.” Inspired by Strawson, even if critical of some of his argu-
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ments, she then goes further, proposing we query not only the normative value of par-
ticular kinds of narratives, but the “attachment to, and valorisation of narrativity” as 
such, against the assumption that these are universally shared.16 
In essence, the critique of narrativity articulated by Woods via Strawson takes aim 
at the notion that narrativity should be treated as an anthropological norm, with two 
potentially harmful consequences: one is for narrative forms to be imposed on individ-
uals or groups who do not spontaneously articulate their own experience in this way; 
the other is for narrative forms to be privileged or nurtured at the expense of other 
means of accessing (and managing, or transforming) the experience of illness. Meta-
phor, philosophy, and the visual arts are briefly discussed by Woods as viable alterna-
tives, or as potentially 
useful ‘ways in’ to the meanings of experience generally and of illness specifically, 
avenues of exploration which might well intersect with or contribute to narrative 
but do not take storytelling as the starting point or telos.17 
In other words, the concern about the limits of narrative — as presented in Woods’ 
important text — is a concern about what and whom the privileging of narrative ex-
cludes, and how (expectations of) narrativity might produce negative effects in so-
called non-narrative people, regardless of their socio-cultural background. The assump-
tion that this approach leaves implicit is that narrativity retains its positive and possibly 
‘foundational’ qualities for those individuals or groups whose norms of life and psy-
chological make-up it reflects. It is this assumption that thinking with Dostoevsky al-
lows us to take some distance from, in order to formulate a critique of narrativity based 
on quite different premises. 
3_What is the Problem with Narrativity? A View from the Underground 
We are now in a better position to understand the value of approaching these debates 
from the perspective of the 19th-century looking forward into the 20th and 21st, rather 
than from the perspective of the present looking back, a mere few decades, to the ‘nar-
rative turn’ in the humanities and social sciences. The character who narrates himself 
in Notes from the Underground does not assume the universality of narrative as an 
anthropological norm. On the contrary, the text reads almost as if Dostoevsky had writ-
ten it to pre-empt all the key elements of contemporary critiques of narrativity in med-
ical humanities. His anti-hero, the person of “heightened consciousness” whose iden-
tity is predicated on “books,” is presented from the start as an historically specific type 
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and, in fact, as the “antithesis of a normal person” (l’homme de la nature et de la vér-
ité).18 He is also clearly situated in sociocultural terms, as an educated person and a 
civil servant living in the city of St. Petersburg, on the threshold between the old Rus-
sian empire and fast-modernizing Europe. 
The whole text is oriented by the contrast between the character of the narrator — 
“a person touched by progress and European civilisation […] a person ‘torn from the 
soil and from his native roots,’ as we say nowadays” — and his socio-historico-anthro-
pological counterparts, the latter variously described as “spontaneous man,” “normal 
man,” man “with strong nerves,” and man “of action,” but also “stupid” and “coarse” 
(all the while insisting that these are not necessarily negative features, as one might 
assume, but possibly “very fine” and indeed enviable characteristics).19 As for the con-
cern, often expressed in relation to experiential narratives of illness, that narrative may 
not be “true to ‘life itself,’” again, for Dostoevsky this is a point of departure rather 
than a retrospective discovery or objection.20 If there is a core message to Notes from 
the Underground it is that, in the same way that the narrator is the antithesis of a normal 
person, so living-by-narrative is antithetical and inimical to “real ‘living life.’” For the 
same reason, the potential for narrative to be harmful rather than redemptive comes 
first in the novel, rather than as a critical afterthought. It seems, in other words, that the 
objections raised by the critics of the psychological and ethical narrativity theses ad-
dress assumptions that became consolidated as such considerably later than when Notes 
from the Underground was written — in a development that, as we have seen, is proph-
esized in the novel and that is fulfilled by the ‘narrative turn’ as exemplified (for the 
medical humanities) in the work of Frank. 
For Dostoevsky, then, narrativity and narrative selfhood are the symptom not of an 
anthropological norm, but of a modern illness. What is most remarkable about this cri-
tique of narrativity is, of course, that it comes to us, defiantly, as a story rather than a 
philosophical essay. What we have in Notes from the Underground is one of the greatest 
novelists of all times, using narrative to warn readers about the dangers of living-by-
narrative. Furthermore, Dostoevsky is far from alone or isolated, among great novelists, 
in making this case. Another example is Miguel de Cervantes’ remarkable story of Don 
Quixote which is often discussed — rightly or wrongly — as the first of the great mod-
ern novels.21 Here is the story of a man who falls into an illness of sorts as a result of 
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his habit of reading too many chivalric tales. As with the underground man, Don Quix-
ote comes to live his life as if he were the hero in one of the many stories he has read. 
And — as with the underground man — great comedic effect is garnered through the 
contrast of the Don with his earthy sidekick Sancho Panza (fine and natural yet stupid 
and coarse). The first great novel, it seems, is a profound warning against the effects of 
living through stories. But the examples do not end there. In this vein, in a previous 
collaboration we have offered a detailed analysis of Thomas Mann’s great novel The 
Magic Mountain. Again, this is a novel fundamentally about illness and its ambiguities: 
is Hans Castorp really ill? Is his illness physical or mental or something else entirely? 
The Magic Mountain is a novel that reflects profoundly and critically not just on the 
novelistic art, but also on a range of other forms of creative expression including cin-
ema, painting, and music, and their relation to the condition Hans Castorp experiences 
during his time in the Davos sanatorium.22 
4_Narrativity as a Modern ‘Condition’ 
The social theorist who has done most to bring to light quite how fundamental this 
warning against stories is to the institution of the modern novel is Árpád Szakolczai. 
In two recent monographs, Szakolczai presents a comprehensive view of the novel from 
its origins in Spain and France in the first half of the 16th century, taking in the birth of 
the realist novel in early 18th-century England, and moving through to Goethe, Dickens, 
and Dostoevsky before engaging in a detailed discussion of the works of Kafka, Mann, 
Broch, Doderer, Bulgakov, Blixen, and Hamvas.23 His analysis of the novel builds on 
a systematic program of earlier work that develops a reflexive historical sociology of 
the genesis of modernity. Szakolczai examines the emergence in Europe of the modern 
public sphere during a phase of transformation associated with the collapse of the Re-
naissance. In his account, this collapse gave rise to the distinctively modern trilogy of 
economics (modelled on the fairground), politics (comedified and “carnivalesque”), 
and science (“alchemical” in its assumption that all can be unmade and remade). Sza-
kolczai refers to the effects of this modern trilogy as the “theatricalisation” of social 
life because of their connection to the 16th century rebirth of theatre. At this historical 
conjuncture, theatre came to function as a space where “new types of social relation-
ships characteristic of the market society […] were ‘experimented’ with,” as in a “la-
boratory” or “incubator.”24 In his more recent works, Szakolczai goes on to develop the 
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argument — remarkable both in its frankness and in its breadth of scholarship — that 
the modern novel provides a “royal road” for those who wish to understand and chal-
lenge the theatricalized character of reality, in order to recover and affirm the possibil-
ity of a grounded and meaningful life. A theatricalized reality is a reality in which the 
distinction between the genuine and the fake has been systematically eroded and it is 
novelists — given the nature of their trade — who have been in the best position both 
to operate with the ambiguity between fact and fiction and to offer the most insightful 
critiques of the dangers of so doing. For Szakolczai, the trajectory of modernity has 
been toward an increasing experience of what he calls permanent liminality through 
which any sense of a limit to human possibilities is attacked and replaced with an open-
ing towards unlimited potential.25 Dostoevsky’s underground man — as noted above 
— is a radically specific character, but still he points to a modernizing trajectory of 
uprooting that happened, during Dostoevsky’s lifetime, to be best expressed in the 
chronotope of an increasingly europhilic St. Petersburg bourgeoisie. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully explicate, or indeed provide a critical 
analysis of, Szakolczai’s thesis about permanent liminality as epitomizing the modern 
condition. Let it suffice here to point to the fact that, in articulating this condition as 
the outcome of dynamics associated with modernity — rather than ‘post’-modernity, 
as might be expected — his thesis resonates strongly with the propositions of at least 
two other important thinkers: Alfred North Whitehead and René Girard. Whitehead 
wrote about the impact of the emergence of Newtonian science on the modern world. 
Central to his own analysis of the modern predicament is also a warning: in this case 
against what he called the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.”26 With this expression 
Whitehead addressed the mistaking of abstractions for concrete reality, a confusion 
akin to what Szakolczai draws our attention to through the concept of “theatricalisa-
tion.” While Whitehead argued that we “cannot think without abstractions,” he also 
stressed that, for this very reason, “it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in crit-
ically revising [our] modes of abstraction,” particularly when these prove to be inade-
quate for dealing with things that are important to us.27 The distinctive, and historically 
unprecedented feature of modes of abstraction associated with the emergence of mod-
ern science is that they purport to describe what is really real against the evidence of 
our own senses, and of “nature as apprehended in our immediate experience.”28 This is 
what Whitehead described as the “bifurcation of nature,” the splitting of our immediate 
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experience of nature as a single reality into two ontologically different regimes of ex-
istence, one objective and value-neutral, the other subjective, sensuous, and brimming 
with values.29 In his attempt to reconcile the scientific description of nature (whose 
practical value was beyond dispute) with morality, Kant sealed this bifurcation into a 
system of metaphysical assumptions that still informs our common sense today. The 
mistrust of experience that plagues Dostoevsky’s anti-hero has its roots in this bifurca-
tion. In so far as what is really real cannot be directly apprehended in/as experience, 
underground man must rely — now more than ever — on “books,” or heteronomous 
norms and models, for any sense of direction. At the same time, he must operate under 
the Kantian notion that for a human being to be moral and dignified — or indeed 
properly human — requires that they act as an autonomous subject. Underground man, 
in other words, is caught in a situation of “double bind.”30 In Szakolczai’s terms, the 
“reasons of [his] mind” have been severed from the “reasons of [his] heart:” what en-
sues is a dangerous sense of being unmoored, where “the mind keeps turning round and 
round, in search for a solution, as when the accelerator is pushed with the gear in neu-
tral.”31 
Like Szakolczai, albeit using different arguments, Whitehead — most notably in 
Science and the Modern World — also stressed the continuity between developments 
in the domain of science and those in other spheres of social life, positing an important 
relationship between scientific materialism and liberal political economy. The modern 
concept of nature as governed by physical laws has its parallel in economic abstractions 
that defined what have become known as ‘laws of the market,’ in a discourse that ren-
dered the modern concept of the market akin to that of nature itself, as the natural foun-
dation for social existence. In other words, the materialistic basis of modern science 
was reproduced in political economy, where 
all thought concerned with social organisation expressed itself in terms of material 
things and capital. Ultimate values were excluded. They were politely bowed to, 
and then handed over to the clergy to be kept for Sundays.32 
With respect to the question of personhood, the corresponding abstraction is the one 
that imagines human beings as fundamentally motivated, indeed constituted, by (more 
or less enlightened) self-interest. Here it is important to note a resonance with the work 
of René Girard, which Szakolczai cites as an explicit source for his own thought. In his 
philosophical anthropology, and in stark contrast with Kant’s, Girard uses the concept 
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of mimesis not as a critique of representationalism in art but as a core theoretical term 
that foregrounds the ‘imitative’ nature of desire itself. To simplify, where for Mattingly 
‘mimesis’ concerns the vexed question of whether art imitates life (does a narrative 
faithfully copy an experience like a picture of a flower copies a flower?), for Girard the 
crucial question of mimesis is not about a representation modeling a reality but about 
the way in which one desire comes to be modeled upon another (is my desire to draw 
a flower copied from what I perceive to be your desire to paint a flower?). Girard’s 
thesis about mimetic desire is thus that the origins of desire are traceable neither to the 
desiring subject, nor to the desired object. Rather, desire is mediated by a third party, 
whose desires provide the model of what is to be desired. Girard was hugely inspired 
by his engagement with the works of Dostoevsky, acknowledging that many of his key 
concepts came from a close reading of Dostoevsky’s works.33 For Girard, Dostoevsky 
is one of the writers who most clearly reveals the mimetic nature of desire. Indeed, the 
underground man is thoroughly enmeshed in the perverse complications that mimetic 
desire is bound to give rise to when it is unrecognized and unmoored from any con-
straints. Consider the famous scene in which he acts up at a party to which he contrived 
to get himself invited specifically because he did not want to spend time with these 
friends/rivals: 
I smiled contemptuously, and walked along the other side of the room, straight 
opposite the sofa, alongside the wall, back and forth between the stove and the 
table. I wanted, with all my might, to show them that I did not need them; mean-
while I deliberately stamped my feet, coming down on my heels. But it was all in 
vain. They didn’t pay me any attention. I had the patience to walk up and down 
like that, right in front of them, from eight o’clock to eleven o’clock, keeping 
always to the same spot… I’m doing it because I want to, and no one can stop 
me.34 
The problem here is desire: the underground man desperately needs his friends/rivals 
to know that he does not need them. His sharpest desire is to show them that he does 
not care to show them anything! His biggest disappointment is that they do not trouble 
themselves to pay attention to his desperate efforts to show them that he does not want 
or care for their attention. And importantly, the underground man carefully conceals all 
this complicated and frustrated mimetic desire, not just from them (who see it anyway), 
but from himself: “I’m doing it because I want to.” Dostoevsky here and throughout 
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his novels is forensically pinpointing the fundamental limitations of a concept of self-
hood predicated on enlightened self-interest that, for him, characterizes the forward 
thrust of European modernization: 
Oh tell me, who was it who first announced, who first proclaimed that man only 
does vile things when he does not know where his real interests lie? And that if he 
were enlightened, if his eyes were opened to his real, normal interests, he would 
at once cease doing vile things and would immediately become good and honour-
able, because being enlightened and understanding where his real advantage lay, 
he would indeed see his own personal advantage in goodness, and because it is 
well known that no one can knowingly act against his own personal advantage, he 
would find himself obliged to do good. Oh, you child! You sweet innocent babe!35 
Dostoevsky’s novel systematically demonstrates, not just the naivety of the modern 
ideology of enlightened self-interest, but its polarizing and disruptive effects on the 
psychic and social orders of the ‘modern’ individuals who are swept up in its inexorable 
influence. Its effects are not harmonious progress or emancipation, but an uprooting 
that leads to the groundless paralysis of perpetual self-reflection that Szakolczai iden-
tifies with the paradox of permanent liminality — and that contemporary proponents 
of narratology elevate, as we have seen, to the status of an existential and ethical norm. 
The issue here is completely missed if one remains fixated on mimesis as a problem of 
how and whether a narrative qua representation corresponds to an experience or an 
external reality. It is not that “life and story […] imitate one another, ceaselessly and 
seamlessly:” life and story are both realities in the lives of real, concrete, flesh-and-
blood people, and it is novelists who are best able both to see their connection and to 
tell their difference.36 Frank is correct to want to orient attention to the great novelists 
and their views on narratology. But the message he draws from them ignores the pro-
found warning that is at the core of Notes from the Underground and that, according to 
Szakolczai, runs across all great novels as a distinctively modern genre. 
5_Conclusion: Narrativity as Pharmakon 
In the preceding discussion we have proposed that the ‘limits of narrative’ can be artic-
ulated not only in terms of what (or whom) a privileging of narrativity excludes, but 
also in terms of the extent to which the construction of selves through narrative can and 
should be regarded as a ‘healthy’ norm, even for those in whom this activity appears to 
come ‘naturally.’ Through Dostoevsky and Szakolczai, we have drawn attention to the 
fact that many of the great modern novels present us with a profound ambivalence in 
relation to the functions of narrative, and that this ambivalence recurrently takes the 
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form of a meditation on illness, often of an indeterminate character. In this interpreta-
tion, the modern novel — arguably the most accomplished form of narrative — can be 
conceived as a therapeutic intervention, a remedy. Like every remedy, however, it has 
the ambivalent character of a pharmakon. 
Our thesis articulates the negative consequences of forgetting the ambivalent char-
acter of narrativity, or what happens when we elevate narrative to an ontological norm. 
What are the implications of this insight for contemporary narrations of illness, specif-
ically? We opened this discussion by tracing the outlines of a historical trajectory, from 
Dostoevsky to Shotter and Gergen (and Frank), that saw the existential value of narra-
tive turned upside down, or inside out. From the second half of the 20th century, we 
argued, textuality and narrativity have been associated with a ‘postmodern’ promise of 
emancipation from the shackles of forms of identity, norms, and values imposed from 
without. If identity is discursive, then, at least in principle, it can be unmade and remade 
at will, from within. When it cannot, it will be a matter of contesting the social struc-
tures that hold it in place. In the meantime, flesh and blood will be just that: indifferent 
matter, inconsequential matter, or at best plastic matter at the service of projects of 
identity construction. 
Against this broad cultural background, in a further twist, illness and death (of flesh 
and blood) may be said to have acquired a specific and paradoxical value for the (post-
)moderns: they have become the antidote to abstraction, anchors for the narrative forg-
ing of lives otherwise potentially adrift in a sea of arbitrary and theoretically limitless 
possibilities. If health, to cite the famous maxim by René Leriche, is “life lived in the 
silence of the organs,” that silence now epitomizes the fact that ‘life’ itself appears 
conspicuously silent as to how it should be lived.37 Life lived in the silence of the or-
gans is life lived under the imperative to fulfill an obligation to be free — for which 
illness itself, with the constraints it puts on what stories can be told, then becomes a 
possible and paradoxical cure.38 The danger of forgetting the ambivalence of narrative, 
when this is elevated to an ontological norm, lies in the value that illness acquires as a 
potential basis for the construction of identity, and the resulting forms of existential 
investment. Dostoevsky makes this plain in the opening lines of Notes from the Under-
ground, where his anti-hero introduces himself to us — this is who he is: 
I am a sick man… I’m a spiteful man. I’m an unattractive man. I think there is 
something wrong with my liver. But I cannot make head or tail of my illness and 
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I’m not absolutely certain which part of me is sick. I’m not receiving any treat-
ment, nor have I ever done, although I do respect medicine and doctors. […] No, 
it’s out of spite that I don’t want to be cured. You’ll probably not see fit to under-
stand this. But I do understand it. […] I know better than anyone that in doing this 
I shall harm no one but myself. Anyway, if I’m not receiving medical treatment 
it’s out of spite. If my liver is hurting, then let it hurt all the more!39 
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